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Abstract This article assesses the innovation policy
objectives underlying the proposed EU Telecom Single Market
(TSM) regulation considering disruptive technological
developments and asks what the regulator in India can
infer from such regulation. The paper explores the network
operator’s dilemma of how to deal with investments in a time
where fundamental innovation comes from outside, and the
regulator’s dilemma of how to improve the conditions for access
to the operators’ networks and safeguard a level playing field.
The measures with respect to two technological developments:
the deployment of 5G and the goal to ensure very high-speed
broadband access in the EU have been analysed. Thought is given
to the effectiveness of imposing active and passive infrastructure
arrangements. Should private law prevail over market regulation?
A mix of regulatory measures is considered.
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I. R egulatory Dilemmas
A. Infrastructure Innovation in India and the Telecoms
Single Market Proposal
Where disruptive technologies change the way people live, work, and socialize, the robustness of communications infrastructure becomes a key policy
consideration in European and other markets, especially those that are not
fully competitive yet. 2 Following the take-off of new services, such as the
Internet of Things (IoT) and Machine to Machine (M2M) communications
on a global scale, the demand for broadband and mobile transmission is
likely to require additional network capacity and innovative infrastructure
specifications to support these new technologies.3 Economic analysis has
shown a robust growth in telecommunications networks in India over the
past decades.4 This growth was due, amongst others, to applying a successful mix of regulation and policy initiatives.5 India’s planning focuses upon
policies that promote technological innovation and global competitiveness.
As Gopalakrishnan, S., and Dasgupta, J. put it, “India’s dominance in innovation capacity has not been mere coincidence. It is a result of the gradually
increasing focus of its policy regime, a focus that has moved from science
to technology and on to innovation and entrepreneurship and supported by
years of planning and implementation.”6 In the advent of 5G and mobile/
fixed telecommunications, India may face different challenges than Europe,
for instance, in terms of the size of the territory, economic growth, population, and technology innovation. The political make-up of India is also
different from the EU. But, there is a connection between telecommunications infrastructure investments and economic growth.7 This may be a rea2

3

4

5

6

7

McKinsey Global Institute, Disruptive technologies: Advances that will transform life,
business and the global economy (May 2013).
T.U. Delft & T.N.O., Steps Towards a Truly Internal Market for e-Communications,
2015 (TNO, TU Delft. 2015).
V. Sridhar, The Telecom Revolution in India: Technology, Regulation, and
Policy (Oxford University Press, 2015); M.R. Narayana, Telecommunications services
and economic growth: Evidence from India, 35(2) Telecommunications Policy 115
(2011).
See, S. Gopalakrishnan and J. Dasgupta, Policies to drive innovation in India in Financing
Entrepreneurship and Innovation in Emerging Markets, (L. Casanova et al ed(s).,
Elsevier Inc., 2018); https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-804025-6.00005-8, adapted
from an earlier version which appeared in the Global Innovation Index 2015: Effective
Innovation Policies for Development, Chapter 8, 121–130 (WIPO, Geneva, 2015).
For an analysis of innovation policy in India over the past decades, see S. Gopalakrishnan
and J. Dasgupta, Policies to drive innovation in India in Financing Entrepreneurship
and Innovation in Emerging Markets, 118-120 (L. Casanova et al ed(s)., 2018).
For an extensive analysis of this link, see K.S. Shridhar and V. Shridhar, Telecommunications
infrastructure and economic growth: evidence from developing countries, 7(2) Applied
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son why the Commission of the European Union (EU) is concerned with the
competitiveness of the European companies, in comparison with companies
in India, and other lesser regulated, bigger markets – such as China,8 and
the United States.
Although the political make-up of India and the EU is different, some
parallels may be drawn from the approaches in regulating infrastructure
innovation policy. This article is not meant to compare the different policies
of India versus the EU. Rather, it asks the question of what the Indian telecoms regulator can infer from the EU approach. For this reason, this article
discusses the proposed EU regulation for the Telecoms Single Market (TSM)
in terms of how it services innovation in the telecommunications industries.
The EU’s Digital Single Market (DSM) Package is aimed at regulating of
digital platforms to improve the Union’s competitiveness in the globalised
economy.9 The recast proposal for a European Communications Code is one
of the key regulatory initiatives of the DSM strategy.10 Just as is the case in
India, the TSM Proposal attempts to strike a balance between the interests of
electronic communications networks (ECN) operators, electronic communications services (ECS) providers, and end-users. One of the EU’s aims is to
simplify the existing regulatory framework (also known as the new regulatory framework (NRF)), by bringing seven EU directives together in one electronic communications code.11 This is not a form of deregulation, but rather
a form of re-organization. Overall, the proposal aims at combining the repeal
of parts of the NRF with the introduction of new industry-directed cluster
regulation. The TSM Proposal has gone through several phases in the legislative process; the initial proposal – known as the draft Connected Continent
Regulation – dates to November 2013; it never materialized. The recast proposal dates from September 2016. At the time of closing of this contribution
(February 2018), it was not yet known whether the Council would adopt the
recast proposal. In comparison with the Connected Continent Proposal, the
TSM Proposal is more forward-looking. The Commission signals numerous

8
9

10

11

Econometrics and International Development 37, 37-56 (2007).
M.R. Ward and S. Zeng, 40(2-3) Telecommunications Policy 89, 89-101 (2016).
TNO et al, Digital Platforms: an analytical framework for identifying and evaluating
policy options (2015).
(‘TSM Proposal 2016’); see also: G. Amendola et al, Re-thinking the EU telecom regulation, 93(1) DigiWorld Economic Journal 17, 17-35 (2014).
Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Regulatory
Fitness and Performance (REFIT): Results and Next Steps, COM (2013) 685 final,
Brussels, 2 October 2013 (REFIT 2013).
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developments in the period up until 2020.12 The Commission focuses on
achieving better access to very high-speed broadband networks and the most
advanced spectrum, including their rollout. The Commission is also looking
for a way to mirror financial instruments – for instance, the amounts that
parties interested in obtaining spectrum must pay – with the requirement for
all stakeholders to be more innovative.13 Prima facie, this seems sensible, but
– different from India – the preferred allocation mechanism for frequency
licences is based on auction procedures in all EU countries. Auctions tend
to drive up investment costs. The financial instruments hardly are aimed at
enabling innovation. The TSM Proposal emphasizes ‘commercial’ innovation that will push the demand for services over very high-speed broadband
networks;14 increased competition at the local level as a result of the activation of smaller frequency cells, that will enable more intricate networks;15
the improvement of the existing instruments for EU spectrum policy;16 and
the separation in market analysis of ‘wholesale only models.17 Next to regulation, EU funding is made available to support the rollout of cross-border
networks. Horizon 2020 (H2020) is the Commission’s workplan to achieve
smart and sustainable growth.18 H2020 offers a host of subsidies to market
parties in terms of network improvement.19 It includes a strong emphasis on

12
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Such as: (i) the ongoing transition from traditional telecommunications infrastructure to
an all-IP environment; (ii) the technical possibilities offered by new and improved underlying infrastructure, which supports almost unlimited transmission capacity of fibre networks; (iii) the continuous convergence between fixed and mobile networks, which will
lead eventually to seamless service provision to end-users, wherever they are and no matter
what terminal equipment they use; and (iv) the development of innovative technical network management, with the advent of Software Defined Networks (SDN) and Network
Function Virtualization (NFV). SDN and NFV will be discussed below. In short, SDN enables access of third parties to network control functions, whereas these third parties continue to control their own physical and virtual core network elements. NFV enables that
certain network functionality can be translated into software, which can run on cheaper,
generic, hardware; P. Alexiades and T. Shortall, The Advent of 5G: Should Technological
Evolution Lead to Regulatory Revolution?, 3 Competition Policy International
Antitrust Chronicle (2016); see also TSM Proposal 2016, p. 1.
The Commission wants “to ensure optimal use of resources, fees should reflect the economic and technical situation of the market concerned as well as any other significant factor determining their value. At the same time, fees should be set in a manner that enables
innovation in the provision of networks and services as well as competition in the market.
[…].” TSM Proposal 2016, consideration 26.
REFIT 2013 and Impact Assessment, part 1/3, p. 19.
Id., at part 1/3, p. 24.
Id., at part 1/3, p. 101.
Id., at part 1/3, p. 77.
Horizon 2020, 2017, Work Programme 2018-2020 available at http://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/sites/horizon2020/files/stratprog_overarching_version_for_publication.pdf.
WP2018-2020.
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stimulating research and ‘innovation activities’, including on telecommunications issues. 20
Typical for the EU’s policy to harmonize rules across the Union, the
Commission’s institutional approach is to continue letting national regulatory authorities (NRAs) in the EU Member States apply the (new) rules,
whilst strengthening the NRAs’ powers. It is interesting to see whether a
form of regulation by independent regulatory authorities could become a part
of the Indian approach to infrastructure innovation policy and regulation.

B. Research question and approach
The question is to what extent a mix of deregulation and cluster regulation
will improve the competitiveness of telcos and OTTs on the global telecoms
markets? The research attempted to define what mix of regulatory measures
could be employed to stimulate innovation and safeguard interoperability in
the European electronic communications sector in the next years of services
transition. A sub-question is whether there is room for incentive regulation
that will stimulate innovation, or whether deregulation is more appropriate
in the transition period. 21 The desired output needs to be based upon different regulatory tools that could complement or supplement existing measures
to safeguard competition:
• In paragraph 2, regulation as a tool to stimulate innovation will be
explored. The TSM Proposal, driven by rapidly involving technological developments, results in effective and sustainable regulation?22
Dilemmas of stakeholders – regulators, incumbents and new entrants
– are also discussed.
• When contemplating regulatory models, it must be considered that
contracts at the wholesale level remain a practical form of self-regulation (paragraph 3). This paragraph includes a short discussion of
cases, notable agreements on infrastructure sharing, and long-term
cooperation.
• Paragraph 4 contains a synthesis and a few recommendations.
20

21

22

M. Granieri and A. Renda, Innovation Law and Policy in the European Union: Towards
Horizon 2020 (Springer, 2012); European Commission, A guide to ICT-related activities
in WP2018-20, 2017.
The research focuses on analysis of the legislative framework and proposed regulation; it
includes studying economic analysis and a few informal empirical discussions with stakeholders who remain anonymous.
S.J.H. Gijrath and J.M. Smits, European Contract Law in View of Technical and Economic
Regulation in The Future of European Contract Law, 53 (K. Boele-Woelki, and W.
Grosheide ed(s)., Deventer, Wolters Kluwer, 2007).
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as a tool to stimulate innovation and

safeguard interoperability

This chapter discusses: shifting regulatory perspectives (2.1), price cap regulation versus incentive regulation (2.2), subsidization innovation (2.3), incentive regulation versus deregulation (2.4), and the options for a smarter mix
of regulation (2.5).

A. Shifting regulatory perspectives
The emphasis of regulation often lies on intervening in harmful situations.23
Often, regulation is aimed predominantly at restricting anti-competitive
behaviour. Such regulation is designed to prevent the occurrence of undesirable activities – in the telecoms sector activities to create barriers to entry
and predatory pricing. Roughly, the European rules consist of two possible
ways of imposing price measures on access. 24 The first way is cost-based
pricing – which may be subjected to many different models to determine the
cost-base calculation method. The underlying thinking is to evaluate what
would be the cost for a new entrant to build an alternative network to be
able to supply similar services. 25 It remains to be seen whether innovation
can be regulated as an element of price cap regulation. But, there is a second
way of intervening that has a link – albeit weak – with innovation: the NRA
can also impose an obligation on the regulated ECN operator to charge
‘reasonable’ prices. 26 As such, price cap regulation may already incentivize
cost reduction measures and replacement investments by the ECN operators.
But what about innovation regulation per se?27
Before discussing this second way of regulation as a tool to stimulate
innovation (2.1.3 – 2.1.5), a glance will be cast at the dilemmas that ECN
operators (2.1.1) and the regulator (2.1.2) are facing in times of disruption.

23

24

25

26
27

Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, Frascati Manual, Proposed
Standard Practice for Surveys and Research and Experimental Development,
(6th edn., OECD Publishing, 2002); B.F. Mooij, Dynamic Efficiency Concerns in EU
Competition Law: What role is awarded to innovation under the EU’s antitrust rules?,
JUR-4IERSCRI Master Paper (B.F. Mooij, 2014).
R. Baldwin et al, Understanding Regulation, 461 (2nd edn., Oxford University Press,
2012).
J.A. Hauge and D.E.M. Sappington, Pricing in Network Industries in Oxford Handbook
of Regulation, 462-499 (R. Baldwin et al ed(s)., Oxford University Press, 2010).
Id., at 462.
A. Butenko and P. Larouche, Regulation for Innovativeness or Regulation of Innovation?,
TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2015-007.
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i. The operator’s dilemma
The electronic communications sector is atypical as it is subject to specific
characteristics that pose recurring significant investment issues. Following
various periods of market liberalization, regulated ECN operators – especially those with SMP – may be turning into gatekeepers of networks at the
wholesale level. An example is the need to determine and achieve optimum
interoperability levels as wholesale markets’ requirements change over time.
Investments made in the ECNs may be lost because of having to adapt to
these technological advances that keep coming from the outside. Generally,
ECN operators will exhibit economies of scale, which will persist over a
wide range of output caused by their customers’ needs. However, their business models are increasingly being challenged by the OTTs.
There is a tension between the gatekeepers’ capacity to innovate incrementally, and the game changers’ ability to innovate more fundamentally. 28 The
ECN operators need to facilitate the processing of growing data streams,
enabled by innovative applications developed and marketed by the OTTs.
But possible additional income because of increasing data processing, does
not, necessarily, yield sufficient revenue to stimulate the ECN operators to
invest substantially in infrastructure innovation. This then causes a risk of
lumpiness of investments by the operators.29 The sunk costs resulting from
investments in infrastructure imply risks associated with the real options the
operator has.30 The operator’s dilemma is how to strike the balance between
network capacity shortages and excess capacity, and how to avoid unnecessary duplicate investments. Moreover, it is difficult for the ECN operators
to predict the long-term durability of their investments, where regulatory
intervention could result in price cap regulation, thus making their investments less tenable.
The interest of ECN operators to get clarity about the regulatory horizon
is evident. They need to know: is the sunset in sight, or should they expect
continuity of ex-ante intervention and asymmetric regulation? Price-cap
regulation could ‘stimulate’ the ECN operator to maintain a lower network
quality as a substitute for price increases that would normally result from the
investments made. Price-cap regulation would be a negative consideration
28

29

30

M. Cave, Encouraging Infrastructure Competition Via the Ladder of Investment, 30(3-4)
Telecommunications Policy 223, 223-237 (2006).
I. Vogelsang, Incentive Regulation, Investments and Technological Change in Regulation
and the Performance of Communications and Information Networks, 1 (G.R.
Faulhaber et al ed(s)., 2012).
Id., at 11-19ff. Many of the economic aspects discussed in this paper emanate from
Vogelsang 2012. I am indebted to his clear views on how economic aspects can influence a
regulator’s choices in terms of dealing with technological change.
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where the operator’s investment would surpass the acceptable benchmark
– and thus result in less or no profits.31 Because prices are often determined
after the investments have been made, the desire to impose price caps and
enforce lower prices thus creates an ex-post conflict with the ex-ante desire
to stimulate innovative investments.32

ii. The regulator’s dilemma
The regulatory climate will require a careful weighing of the factors that are
influenced by the industry-specific features, firm behaviour, and regulatory
incentives.33 In a time where the Commission wants to steer towards more
convergence between fixed and mobile infrastructure, it must be observed
that the impact of regulation on fixed ECN operators is rather different from
the impact on mobile ECN operators. Fixed ECN operators still are subject
to stronger regulatory scrutiny than mobile operators. Unlike the case of
regulating fixed networks, ex-ante market regulation of mobile ECN operators is less likely to occur. This is due to the circumstance that (most) mobile
players are not considered to have SMP (a past exception being the market
for mobile terminating tariffs). However, national governments are likely to
attempt generating or imposing very substantial fees on the mobile operators
who acquire new frequency licences. Whereas mobile ECN providers operate under a fixed term frequency licence, once an ECN or a cable operator
has obtained a registration or licence to operate in the EU, there is no predetermined end date or life span for exploitation of such registration/licence.
The fixed operator’s administrative fee is significantly lower than the price
of a frequency lot – and the differences between NRA administration fees
depend on the same factors, notably, turn-over. Besides, special conditions
are hardly ever imposed on fixed operators at the issue of the registration/
licence.
Still, irrespective of the shorter life-cycle of radio frequencies’ licences,
it appears that mobile ECN operators are more inclined than fixed operators to make innovative network investments that they can write off during
the licence term. The fixed term entails that mobile ECN operators need to
31

32

33

J. Kwoka, Investment Adequacy under Incentive Regulation, (Working Paper No. 09-001,
Department of Economics, Northeastern University, 2009).
See D. Brito et al, Can Two-Part Tariffs Promote Efficient Investment on Next Generation
Networks?, Mimeo 2008 (Brito et al, 2008); S.J.H. Gijrath, Telecommunications Law in
the Digital Age 3.0: Interoperability, Innovation, Internationalisation & an Imploding
Soufflé, inaugural speech, 2014 (S.J.H. Gijrath, 2014), and Granieri, M., Renda, A. 2012.
H. Gruber and P. Koutroumpis, Competition enhancing regulation and diffusion of innovation: the case of broadband networks, 43(2) Journal of Regulatory Economics
168, 169 (2013).
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replace or modify their mobile radio access network (RAN) equipment every
time they acquire a licence to use a new generation of frequencies. It should
also be kept in mind that, contrary to the procedures used for registering
fixed operators or permitting them to enter the market, the government
agency that allocates the frequency licence has the option to attach special
conditions to the exploitation of the frequency licence (see below).
Since the emphasis on asymmetric regulation on fixed ECN operators
is likely to decrease over the coming years, the Commission is looking for
another way to steer the innovation it desires so much. Again, this highlights
the regulator’s dilemma on how to deal with asymmetry of information and
the need to safeguard a level playing field, as expressed by the Commission. 34
A more lenient approach, considering the rise of innovative services competition at the retail level, could lead to symmetric regulation.35

iii. Innovation regulation
The Commission wants to improve the conditions for access to financial
sources for research and innovation purposes36 and provide assurance
that innovative ideas could be turned into products and services that create growth and jobs.37 These are broad and generic objectives. I will look
at these from the perspective of infrastructure competition, meaning that
I am focusing more on regulation for innovativeness rather than on regulation of innovation.38 There is a material side to translating the policy
objectives into regulation – what type of behaviour does the Commission
wish to regulate or deregulate; and an institutional side – which agencies
34

35

36

37

38

“In services, competition between local providers of electronic communications services
that bundle network access with services and global providers of services over the top of
the networks reinforces the right of the EU to act to ensure a level playing field.” TSM
Proposal 2016, p. 15.
In the current era, a differently balanced market regulation is becoming a major policy
concern: “[…] Disruptive innovations, while very convenient and financially beneficial to
end users, bring the need to analyse their impact on existing competition conditions and
possible distortive effects stemming from differentiated regulatory treatment, as well as
the adequacy of existing regulation in a changed environment.” Impact Assessment Part
1/3, p. 28.
Europe 2020: A Strategy for smart, sustainable, and inclusive growth, COM (2010),
2020; and Commission Communication Europe 2020 Flagship Innovation Union, COM
(2010) 546, 6 (Commission Communication 2010).
See also Commission Communication: An Investment Plan for Europe, COM (2014) 903
final (Commission Communication 2014).
See also the interesting perspective of L.B. Moses, How to Think about Law, Regulation
and Technology, Problems with ‘Technology as a Regulatory Target available at http://
dx.doi.org/10.5235/ 17579961.5.1.1 (Bennet Moses 2013); P. Larouche and A. de Streel,
An Integrated Regulatory Framework for Digital Networks and Services, CERRE Policy
Report, 27 January 2016 (P. Larouche, A. De Streel, 2016).
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should supervise and stimulate such behaviour. There is a marked lack of
considering how innovation within the EU can be stimulated. The Impact
Analysis of the TSM Proposal reiterates that infrastructure competition and
innovation are important driving forces for economic growth in the coming years. However, the Proposal lacks an in-depth analysis on whether the
investments that must be made by both the fixed and mobile ECN operators
in their infrastructure in the coming years include the cost of fundamental innovation, i.e., for the construction and roll-out of Next Generation
Networks (NGN), or whether the investments will focus on funding incremental innovation, i.e., for the maintenance and updating of network protocols and equipment.39 This makes it difficult to consider the actual legal
impact of the proposed regulation.40
On the material side, the supplementary documents to the TSM Proposal
show that the Commission struggles in dealing with innovation that comes
from within (incumbents) or from outside OTT players, including companies
with innovative mobile offers from India. One of the regulator’s dilemmas is
that the costs made to maintain the gatekeeper’s network are relatively transparent but the costs made for fundamental innovation are not. Asymmetry
of information between the regulator and the incumbent operators remains
a prevailing problem, hence, probably, the focus on incumbents rather than
OTTs. Whether a fixed or mobile ECN operator is subject to market regulation or not, it must decide on investing in infrastructure to ensure its
networks adapt flexibly to customer demand. The ECN operator has information regarding technical specifications at its disposal, which may put it
at a competitive advantage. It has a menu of choice on how to configure its
network. It may have a head start where it can weigh the different risks and,
thus, different outcomes it may expect. It is an important economic question
in the debate about how to optimize investments in ECNs – especially the
non-core intelligent elements – by operators who are still subject to market
regulation. Especially the highly important investments in NGN should be
subject to scrutiny as the cost will be difficult to plan and the level of intervention is unknown to the operator.41

iv. Which regulatory tools are effective?
The TSM Proposal attempts to map the economic and social impact of the
regulatory tools it prescribes. The Proposal also presents a host of options
39

40
41

A. Butenko and P. Larouche, Regulation for Innovativeness or Regulation of Innovation?,
TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2015-007.
As can be seen in REFIT 2013.
M. Arve and G. Zwart, Optimal Procurement and Investment in New Technologies under
Uncertainty, TILEC Discussion Paper, DP 2014-028.
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for innovation regulation.42 Any chosen mix of regulatory tools is likely
to have profound effects on investment,43 which is ultimately necessary to
enable end-users to adopt innovations.44 Innovation in the rapidly changing
electronic communications markets goes beyond product innovation.
At the basic level, the available toolkit leaves the following options: (i) the
repeal (parts of) the NRF; or, conversely, (ii) the enhanced application, re-interpretation and/or stricter enforcement of the NRF; or (iii) the imposition of
renewed and directed regulatory instruments.45
At the institutional level, the TSM Proposal is aimed at bestowing the
execution of policy goals more on the NRAs. Article 3, second paragraph,
of the recast TSM Proposal emphasizes four tasks for the NRAs: (i) the –
already existing task of – stimulation of competition in the electronic communications markets should be focused more on the stimulation of efficient
competition at the infrastructure level; (ii) the stimulation of access to and
take-up of very high speed broadband networks by all EU citizens and companies;46 (iii) the contribution of the further development of the internal
market through the removal of the remaining obstacles and the creation of
convergent conditions for the investment in and the delivery of electronic
communications networks, associated facilities and services; which goal
shall be achieved through the development of common regulations and predictable regulatory methods, which serve the effective, efficient and coordinated use of spectrum, open innovation, the establishment and development
of trans-European networks, the availability of interoperability of pan-European services and end-to-end connectivity; and (iv) the assurance that EU
citizens will take up the widespread high fixed and mobile capacity and
the underlying ECS, and realization of the maximal advantages in terms of
choice, price, and quality.
The TSM Proposal also seems to factor in that the differentiation between
fixed and mobile infrastructure becomes less visible. It is unclear what the
effect of that is for infrastructure regulation.

42
43

44

45
46

TSM Proposal 2016, 121ff.
G. Guthrie, Regulating infrastructure: The impact on risk and investment, 44(4) Journal
of Economic Literature 925, 925-972 (2006).
H. Gruber and P. Koutroumpis, Competition enhancing regulation and diffusion of innovation: the case of broadband networks, 43(2) Journal of Regulatory Economics
168, 169 (2013). Gruber, H., Koutroumpis, P. 2012.
TNO, TU Delft, 2015.
See: Support for the preparation of an impact assessment to accompany an EU initiative on reducing the costs of high-speed broadband infrastructure deployment (SMART
2012/0013) (Analysys Mason, 2013).
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B. From price cap to incentive regulation?
Some authors consider the current EU framework a “regulatory distortion of
competition”, which inhibits investments.47 They point out that regulatory
distortion has three causes:
(i) The inability of ECN operators (they seem to refer to incumbents) to
make a fair return, which return, according to the authors, is needed
to fund further network investments. This inability to be profitable is
made worse by an uneven playing field with the entry on the market
of game changers: the OTTs who mostly come from outside the EU
and are not subject to any form of ex-ante regulation.48 According
to these authors, asymmetric regulation could well miss the mark in
achieving the goals of better end-user services;
(ii) The mandated inefficiencies in the mobile communications market.
This has a lot to do with the prices realized in the allocation of spectrum, which are so high that these costs may have a negative impact
on the speed of the 4G long term evolution (‘LTE’) and 5G rollouts.
This does not benefit end-users. Both economists and the Commission
argue that barriers to entering already fragmented mobile markets
are a problem too;49 and
(iii) The lack of a harmonized EU approach, according to them, is an issue
as well. Here the authors seem to refer to different access conditions
across the EU.
The third argument is not very convincing. At least, the Commission is
very much concentrating on harmonization measures. About the challenges
of making investments, these authors conclude that a shift at the policy level
towards measures that reinvigorate investments is much needed.50 Would the
solution also point at turning the level playing field approach upside down?
Should NRAs have an eye for the challenges that these gatekeepers face from

47

48

49

50

A-M Allouët et al, Achieving a Level Playing Field between the Players of the Internet
Value Chain, 93(1) Communications & Strategies 17-34 (2014); W.D. Bock et al, Reforming
Europe’s Telecoms Regulation to Enable the Digital Single Market, 93(1) Communications
& Strategies 17-34 (2014); in: G. Amendola et al, Re-thinking the EU telecom regulation,
DigiWorld Economic Journal 17-35 (2014); Boston Consulting Group, Reforming
Europe’s Telecoms Regulation to Enable the Digital Single Market, report for ETNO
2012 (Boston Consulting Group 2012).
Deloitte and Touche, Will 4G further disrupt telecoms markets? Opportunities and
threats for incumbent players, D&T, Computer world (Deloitte and Touche 2014).
W.D. Bock et al, Reforming Europe’s Telecoms Regulation to Enable the Digital Single
Market, 93(1) Communications & Strategies 24-25 (2014).
Id., at 27.
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the game changers?51 According to some, the answer should be positive. The
justification for intervention is that the past measures to ensure network
capacity and better QoS have come at a significant cost to the gatekeepers.
To some extent, the ECN operators facilitate the provision of innovative services of the game changers, who do not have to make network investments
and are able to minimize the cost of access with the help of the current regulatory framework. Some argue that the disruption caused by OTTs is the
new imbalance that distorts the level playing field.52 Their solution seems
to be: no more price cap regulation – at least not in relation to services
offered with the help of innovative investments. 53 Although the critics of
price regulation do not really address the possibility of being made subject
to a “reasonable price” regulation, it can be inferred from their arguments
that their preference is for no more price regulation at all on ECN operators.
The proponents of no regulation argue that such absence would, by default,
function as an incentive to free financial means to innovate. An alternative to a regulatory holiday would be for the EU to make available more
special funds to ECN operators to enhance or even fundamentally improve
their network infrastructure. An example is the already mentioned H2020
program.54
Incentive regulation could serve to stimulate a regulated ECN operator
to make more fundamental innovative investments in its network to solve
the bottlenecks in the transmission of data. As such, these operators could
anticipate alternative investments by game changers in complementary
infrastructure if they feel they can do this better, quicker and/or more (cost-)
effectively. Increased competition would lead to lower prices and increased
demand for the ECNs. Thus, the value of the network is safeguarded.
Increased competition could stimulate innovation in terms of investment to
solve bottlenecks, by both the gatekeepers and the game changers. An example is service providers developing alternative by-pass infrastructure.
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Id., at 21.
A-M Allouët et al, Achieving a Level Playing Field between the Players of the Internet
Value Chain, 93(1) Communications & Strategies 17-34 (2014).
W.D. Bock et al, Reforming Europe’s Telecoms Regulation to Enable the Digital Single
Market, 93(1) Communications & Strategies 27-30 (2014); The gatekeepers must be
allowed to “set different prices for their services to develop innovative network management solutions so they can offer differentiated, value-adding services, while maintaining a
non-discriminatory approach”.
EU subsidies by their nature do not fall under the state aid provisions of Articles 107-109
TFEU simply because these provisions apply to the Member States offering such aid, and
not to the Commission; cf. Commission Communication 2010.
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C. Subsidization of innovation?
It makes sense for all ECN operators to become global frontrunners in terms
of network convergence in a future where IoT and M2M are to become a
part of daily life. This paragraph discusses briefly the investments in very
high-speed broadband networks (also known as NGN), which may be a
marked difference in comparison with India.
The Commission remains determined to continue its support of ECN
investments in NGN to pursue its desire for sustainable job growth in the
EU. The Commission has launched various initiatives providing subsidies
to support the rollout and deployment of NGN across the EU, especially
where such would enhance interoperability of such networks. The basis for
this initiative can be traced back to H2020. The subsidization of very highspeed broadband networks may be used by the Commission to promote and
enhance the so desired IP connectivity of the EU citizens and companies.
However, funds are limited, and the outcome of subsidization is uncertain.
The actual execution is a matter of interested parties actively knowing and
pursuing announcements of financial aid.
The EU subsidies programs are not always easy to access. It is not entirely
clear from the assessments so far, what the results have been so far. Nor is
there enough data to determine what subsidies will be or have been effective.55 As pointed out, there is a clear downside for the gatekeepers when
only the fundamental innovators are given access to or benefit from government funds to innovate. Such an approach would entail the risk that the
game changers are in a better position to profit from subsidized innovation
at the expense of the ECN operators.
What subsidies could be granted to operators for the deployment of NGN
in the context of 5G convergence? Even if the Commission succeeds in better coordination of frequency allocation procedures, the actual deployment
of 5G and broadband networks remains a matter of national law. H2020
appears less focused on supporting 5G research. Rather, there is a steady
flow of money towards parties who investigate better security measures.
Another area of material concern to the Commission is the lack of
access to networks in rural areas in the EU.56 The Communications that
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European Ideas Network, Overall Assessment of the Communication from the
Commission, Europe 2020, a Strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth,
(2010); H2020 2017; Taking stock of the Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable and
inclusive growth and 3 annexes, COM (2014), 130 final/2 (Commission Communication
2014-2017).
TSM Proposal 2016.
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accompany the 2014 Regulation57 contain the conditions under which aid
to parties wishing to roll-out very high-speed networks may be justified.58
Moreover, the conditions for subsidies appear to have a geographical scope,
i.e., national aid may be granted to ensure that EU citizens in rural areas
will not be prevented from access to NGN (these are called ‘white’ areas, as
opposed to ‘black’ areas where NGNs are active – black areas state aid will
not be permitted).59 The conditions formulated for aid also contain circular
reasoning and assessment. The money spent on research must bring significant improvements in terms of network capacity, the speed of communication, and innovation. What would be the most reliable benchmark to assess
actual results for NGN improvements? This is a difficult hurdle for agencies granting subsidies. NGN specific subsidies could ring-fence the freedom
of the recipient operators or construction firms to make choices necessary
in catering for the consequences of innovative technological changes to the
accompanying specifications of very high-speed broadband networks. The
TSM Proposal does not consider how subsidies for NGN technological innovation in the electronic communications sector could be designed better.
The Proposal is focused on market regulation in a different universe than
the H2020 environment. The power of an incentive is related closely to the
risk that the operator must bear. With Vogelsang, I agree that the non-committed regulator should better consider what different forms of incentive
regulation could be applied. Soft profit-sharing regulation could include a
softer approach to what (excess) profits an ECN operator, who does invest
heavily in fundamental innovation, could keep. Such an approach would still
preserve the extent to which the regulated operator would remain a claimant
of residual profits. Conversely, according to Vogelsang, more profit sharing could also reduce incentives to invest. He also believes that asymmetric
network sharing that favours the regulated operator will not work. Simply
because the operator would be incentivized to overinvest as there would
be a much lower risk in terms of ex-post price regulation. In his analysis,
cost-reducing incentives should be deemed largely independent of the pricecap levels, so that investment incentives would be safeguarded.60
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D. From incentive regulation to deregulation?
Case law developments suggest that the Commission may hinge more on
relying upon the market investor principle: less subsidization and less regulatory intervention.61 Deregulation does not mean further liberalization of
NGN per se. In the EU, less intervention and more reliance on the market
investor principle is likely to be supplemented by the harmonization of NGN
QoS in the Member States.
The choice of regulatory instruments creates timing issues. It is difficult
for a regulator to warrant that incentive regulation could serve to lengthen
the regulatory commitment period necessary for the successful grant and
implementation of incentives. Vogelsang points out that, from an economic
perspective, making such a commitment for the full-time horizon of infrastructure or innovation investments is impossible for an ECN operator. The
compatibility of incentive subsidies that aim at stimulating efficient investments could become uncertain. It is exactly for this reason that any form of
incentive regulation for innovative network investments requires periodic
reviews and, possibly, interim modification. This may be difficult to achieve
and the choice for the type of regulation also creates governance issues, as
reasonable market expectations need to be honoured.62 From an administrative law perspective, regulation must be non-discriminatory, predictable,
precise, and sustainable, and it makes sense if other countries adopt such
principles. But, it will be challenging to create a meaningful governance
framework for incentive regulation.63 Besides, it is difficult to see how the
benefits for society that may come from incentive regulation could surpass
the benefits from innovation in deregulated markets.
To a large extent, the criteria for scoping the legal aspects of subsidizing
innovation are dependent on economic analysis based on the rate-of-return
of investments made.
By the spring of 2018, the provisions in the TSM Proposal concerning
the Commission’s plans to coordinate the timings and conditions for the
frequency allocation procedures in the Member States appeared to be in dire
straits.64 Innovation as a policy goal of the allocation of the 5G spectrum
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European Commission v. France and Orange on the application of the market investor
principle as regards the participation of France in Orange, Case C-486/15 P, 2013 (ECJ
2013).
G.E. Marchant et al, Innovative Governance Models for Emerging Technologies,
(Edward Elgar Publishing, Cheltenham, 2013).
Id.
The legislative procedure is complex and long. In 2018 the status was that the proposal was
going to a trialogue, which includes feedback from the European Parliament. See also the
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comes to the fore. The Member States must describe their innovation goals
in a clear manner in the allocation instrument; where possible, the responsible Minister must also calculate in advance the cost of such measures both
at the national and the EU level.65 With this sub-clause, the Commission
orders the Member States to include measures to promote innovation and
business improvements. The power to include specific measures in the licensing process is left to the Member States’ government agencies in charge of
5G allocation. Since the NRAs are supposed to be independent agencies
from the issuing ministry, the question is why the Commission leaves the
stimulation of innovation for mobile networks to the national governments.
In all likelihood, the reason is instrumental: only a national government is
competent to issue specific regulations together with the rules for frequency
allocation and subsequent licences.66 From a contract law perspective, this is
an interesting option, but it leaves little room for negotiation since it is the
issuing agency that decides the terms of the licence single-handedly.

III. Smarter

regulation: a menu for choice

A. The benefits from smarter regulation
Where ECN must be reconfigured to enable and support technological innovations, such IoT, M2M, and the digital transformation of different industries, in my view, this should go hand in hand with increased certainty on
regulation of market parties in the IoT and M2M value chains; the reduction of heterogeneity in regulation in favour of start-ups; the improvement
of connectivity for SIM-based M2M services; the increase of confidence in
information and network security as well as privacy; a faster adoption of
5G and ubiquitous roll-out of very high-speed networks both directly to the
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requirements laid out by the Bureau Europeen des Unions de Consommateurs, European
Electronic Communications Code, BEUC key demands for trilogue negotiations on consumer protection, (2017). This paper also brings in regulatory concerns as regard data
security and personal data protection.
Art. 54, TSM Proposal 2016.
An example of imposing innovation through the process of allocating a frequency licence
occurred in the Netherlands in 2011 and again in 2017. The Minister in charge of the
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holders to safeguard that digital radio reception (DAB+) would become available throughout the Netherlands. The Minister wanted the licence holders to invest in digital radio in
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home and to street cabinets. This should also safeguard a sustainable backbone, which is required for many IoT and M2M applications. Moreover,
there are many technical reports that underline that the 5G rollout must
go together with investments in upgrades of the mobile network and fixed
infrastructure. But there is no position yet on whether the ECN licence holders should finance both.
This synthesis contains a few remarks on the Commission’s reasoning
and its menu for choice in terms of policy, and the effective governance of
innovation in electronic communications markets and what India’s regulator
could infer from this in terms of promoting infrastructure innovation.

i. A policy menu for choice
It appears that the Commission, considering the diverging aims and goals
attached to technological innovation, finds that more delegation to the
NRAs, combined with a mix of measures and means is likely to yield the
best results for effective intervention. This is not an issue for a federal state
with national policy objectives for infrastructure, such as India. The stimulation of access to very high-speed broadband networks is a policy goal and
not a means per se that NRAs can apply pro-actively.
The case of India is very different from the EU. It is clear from the analysis
of the TSM Proposal that the policy goal of innovation could be anchored
more securely in the law. But the question as to how is difficult to answer
and so it may be hard to infer a sustainable regulatory approach from the
EU.
This paper asked what type of regulation could be a suitable instrument
to further stimulate innovation. Having looked at available regulatory tools,
the shifting regulatory perspectives, possible side-effects, two proposals for
regulating network levels for services interoperability, subsidies, standardization, and self-regulation, the general feeling is that a fresh approach is
required. Moreover, given that the law simply cannot keep up with the speed
of technological change, more flexibility is needed. This may be an area that
India’s regulator could explore.
Although often market players propagate stable and sustainable regulation, the menu of choice in times of rapid technological changes may boil
down to mixing different approaches to create the best regulatory cocktail.
An example of mixed regulation could be the provision of incentives for
the parties who obtain 5G licences and who are under a rollout obligation
for new infrastructure. Such incentives could be subject to symmetric and
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clearer access rights and obligations to enable the provision of innovative
services over such (possibly even partially shared) infrastructure.
By mixing the regulatory approaches, it is probably easier to achieve a
balance between the need for investments incentives, whilst maintaining the
level playing field. It seems that both gatekeepers and game changers would
benefit from such a mixed and intermediate regulatory approach. When
done properly, intermediate regulation can be equal to incentive regulation, which is usually based on a mix of cost reduction and efficient pricing.
Moreover, regulators should ask whether negative side effects of interoperability of networks, such as possible network congestion and increased risks
for network integrity and security, are a part of the game. If so, this justifies
an approach that is not solely concerned with safeguarding competition and
enforcing competition law but is also concerned with protecting end-users’
interests better. An option for the regulator could be to make temporary
compensatory adjustments.67 There we agree that ‘incentive-mitigation’ such
as some form of subsidy or adjustments to the tightness of regulation, even
for a limited period, could be necessary and effective.68
In the transition period, if no rollout incentives are available, an asymmetric regulatory holiday could well be considered as a part of the mix.
The regulator should explain why and how the governance and enforcement measures it expects support innovation.69 Perhaps it would be a good
idea to investigate further that in what manner the specialized regulatory agencies can act pro-actively to stimulate technological innovation.
Flexibility and openness in their governance models must be improved to
enable the NRAs to better deal with the developments on an increasingly
dynamic playing field. Perhaps such an overall body in the vein of the Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) could serve to ensure the quality of
market regulation.
Looking backwards and forward, a key issue is how the regulator can
ensure that governance structures are in place. Such structures should monitor effectively not only where the money goes, but also whether the ensuing
investments indeed result in reaching the goals of cooperation initiatives.
What is needed to make a governance structure efficient? There must be a
fair and transparent process for decision making, for instance, on incentive
67
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regulation. The recast TSM Proposal aims at coordinating the diverse practices for network innovation in the Member States by standardising the
conditions for frequency allocation in the Member States. But, there is no
political consensus in the EU on the coordination of 5G allocation.70 Hence,
it does not make sense to place all cards on harmonization of 5G regulation
to stimulate innovation. One lesson from this is that it makes sense for a
national or a federal regulator to be predictable when it comes to timing,
allocation method, and – in particular regarding innovation policy – notice
to market parties on what their licence obligations will prescribe in terms of
investment and/or sourcing obligations.
Catering for network reliability cannot solely be a task for gatekeepers.
Although no one will argue that the liberalization of electronic communications should be undone, to put the onus for network reliability predominantly on the sitting ECN operators probably misses the mark. Network
reliability and security remain a government task and a joint responsibility.
Game changers, who do not operate their own networks, have an interest
in ensuring that data traffic is as hassle-free and as safe as possible. Current
regulation on network and information security should be taken into
account when considering how to best promote infrastructure competition
and innovation.
The considerations to the recast TSM Proposal glorify innovation; yet,
innovation hardly forms part of the legal provisions. It is self-evident that
innovation is the key driver of economic growth. But, hollow considerations to regulatory proposals do not really provide meaningful guidance to
interested and affected parties.71 What is the Commission telling the governments, the markets, and the end-users when the policy goal of innovation
is not supported by clearly described, concrete, measurable and enforceable
terms? Surely, India’s regulator can infer from this lack of depth that it can
translate its policy objectives for the coming years more concretely and, if
necessary, anchor them in forward-looking regulation. An important precondition for effective intervention is that the regulator must be equipped to
anticipate economic and social effects of business models that are required
to constant adaptation to fast going technological and market developments.
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